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Introduction
The idea of competition in health care can provoke strong
reactions from commentators, with some for and others
against. Proponents of competition generally fall into one
of two camps: those who believe in the innate value of
market-based resource allocation (i.e., a decentralised
approach to production and consumption decisions, with
prices providing the main signals for such decisions) and
those who favour the market more for its potential to
correct the failures of government regulation. Both camps
typically expect competition to do the following things:
strengthen patient choice, stimulate innovation, improve
quality, enhance efficiency and control costs — in short, to
give people what they want in the least costly way possible.
Opponents of competition, in contrast, typically fear it will
lead to undesirable outcomes such as a reduction in quality,
access to health care based on ability to pay rather than
medical need and, as a result, inequity and inefficiency in
the distribution of health services.
Given these differing views, the European Commission
asked its Expert Panel on Effective Ways of Investing in
Health to consider if and how competition among health
care providers might benefit health systems in the Euro-
pean Union. This article summarises the main findings and
conclusions of the panel’s final report [8].1
Instrument rather than goal
Competition is an instrument for organising decisions
about the use of resources.2 Its primary purpose is to
improve efficiency (value for money). In the context of
health systems, improving efficiency is important in so far
as it contributes to the attainment of broader goals such as
ensuring all people are able to use needed, cost-effective,
quality health services without experiencing financial
hardship. Neither competition nor strict reliance on gov-
ernment regulation is likely to be effective in achieving all
of these goals. Attempts to avoid or correct market failure
can result in government failure, and vice versa.
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One size does not fit all
Providers usually compete for patients, based on price or
quality or both price and quality, but they may also com-
pete for budgets — for example, in the case of auctions for
public–private partnership contracts to provide a specific
service or through choice of location (which may either
help to attract or deter patients). Each of the three broad
types of competition has its own set of requirements, as set
out in Table 1. Which type is most suitable will depend on
the characteristics (structure) of a given health care market.
The conditions required for provider competition to
improve health system performance vary across countries,
health system sub-sectors and time. They include: adequate
information about provider prices and quality and the ability
of patients to interpret this information; standardised products
and services; the existence of multiple providers and buyers;
and easy entry and exit for providers. Information about
quality is especially important if competition (and patient
choice) are intended to improve access to high-quality care.At
least in theory, medical goods, such as equipment and phar-
maceuticals, tend to meet the conditions for effective com-
petition. For clinical services the introduction or expansion of
competition present considerable difficulties, in particular
because of the presence of information asymmetries.
Policies to introduce or increase competition should be
informed by analysis of the conditions in place and prob-
able effects. They should also be accompanied by policies
that allow the market to function in line with predefined
objectives.
Provider competition and patient choice
Provider competition is not the same as patient choice of
provider. Both concepts emerged at around the same time
in many national health policy debates. Because of this,
they are often seen as two sides of the same coin, but they
are in fact distinct. Though not uncontroversial, patient
choice is an important principle in some health systems. It
does not, however, automatically imply competition among
health care providers. Health systems can provide patients
with alternatives to choose from even if providers do not
compete for patients. For example, providers may compete
to be included in a network of providers, without patients
having choice of provider, or health professionals may
choose among competing providers on behalf of patients.
Patient choice is thus possible without provider competi-
tion, and vice versa.
What does economic theory say about provider
competition?
Information on relevance, quality, process and outcome is
critical if competition is to enhance efficiency in health
care. Where there is adequate information about quality of
care and dominant positions are absent, economic theory
suggests competition will force organisations to be more
efficient and innovative and may therefore reduce unit
prices. If prices are regulated and quality is observable as
well as used to guide demand, economic theory predicts
competition to improve health service quality.3 If prices are
not regulated but set by providers themselves, however,
there is no theoretical presumption about the impact of
competition on quality.
The asymmetry of information that characterises much
health care creates considerable scope for supplier-in-
duced demand. Competition can therefore increase the
Table 1 Types of provider competition
Type of competition Requirements for competition Information needs
Competition among
health care providers
in a market
Several providers; goods and services more or less
substitutable; providers have freedom over relevant aspects
of the service they provide; patients have free choice of
provider; providers compete to attract patients; payment to
providers based on patients treated
Information about location, quality and prices of
providers; information available to patients and to
third-party payers
Competition for the
market (e.g.,
competitive bidding)
Several providers (fewer than above) compete for the right to
provide a service or goods; only one or a few providers will
be selected in a geographical area or to provide a specific
service (e.g., drugs, public–private partnerships for
hospitals); mechanisms to determine the selected provider
include tenders and auctions
Ability to describe the service or goods in an
accurate and verifiable way
Yardstick competition Provider incentives based on comparative performance
information; more useful when providers are geographically
dispersed and not directly competing with rivals
Good information about providers; definition of
performance indicators
3 However, Brekke et al. [2] theoretically show that, even when
prices are fixed, with semi-altruistic providers and a fairly general
cost structure the relationship between competition and quality is
generally ambiguous. According to them, this is consistent with, and
potentially explains, the mixed empirical evidence.
230 P. P. Barros et al.
123
number of services provided and billed, thereby
increasing overall health system expenditure. This higher
spending may or may not be justified by additional
health benefits for (some parts of) the population.
Concerning geographical access to health services,
more competition can improve this dimension of quality
by encouraging the entry of new providers. It may prove
harmful, however, where a low population density, and
thus aggregate demand, makes the provision of some
health services economically non-viable without subsi-
dies, or where there are inadequate measures to prevent
the emergence of local/regional monopolies for the pro-
vision of health services that require a minimum efficient
scale.
By accommodating the heterogeneity of patients in a
decentralised manner, competition may also contribute to a
more responsive health system.
What does the (limited) empirical evidence tell us?
The empirical evidence base on competition among pro-
viders of health care is small but expanding. It focuses on a
limited set of countries. For competition among hospitals,
most studies are from the USA [9] and the UK [5, 11],
while for competition in primary care the Nordic countries
are most often studied.4 In the market for (generic)
medicines, many European countries—including, for
example, the Netherlands [1]—use tendering as an instru-
ment to lower spending on outpatient prescription phar-
maceuticals through competitive bidding and other
negotiation mechanisms to provide wider access at lower
prices [6].
Under regulated prices, the studies reviewed by Gay-
nor and Town [10] point to a positive impact of com-
petition on quality of care (proxied by mortality rates),
but these studies are performed in the context of USA
and UK health systems only. Under market-determined
prices, the empirical evidence shows a more diverse
picture with an almost equal occurrence of positive, zero
and negative effects of competition on quality. Con-
cerning the empirical evidence on competition in hospital
markets, the heavy reliance in the literature on hospital
mortality rates (almost the sole indicator used to measure
the effects of competition on performance) is very con-
troversial, given its major limitations.
Competition may also have an effect on equity of access
to health care. The limited evidence, however, does not
allow for general presumptions about the effects of com-
petition on equity of access to health care.5
Know your market
The impact of competition on the health system, on the
demand and supply of health care and, ultimately, on the
health of the population is highly conditional on the envi-
ronment in which it is introduced. Empirical evidence
reflects the specificities of context, with results varying over
time and by market, country and policy design. Apparently
minor differences in market characteristics can lead to very
different outcomes. Fostering more competition in markets
in which providers already compete effectively is unlikely to
result in significant additional benefit.
Anticipate unintended consequences
Provider competition may have unanticipated adverse
effects, especially if introduced without careful analysis of
the relevant market and context or without ensuring the
necessary conditions are in place. Competing providers
may focus on quality indicators that are being measured
while at the same time neglecting (important) aspects of
quality that are not being measured. If competition lowers
prices, there may be a strong volume effect (an increase in
the use of services) and expenditure may rise. A decrease
in competition leading to higher prices can also trigger a
positive volume response if providers are able to induce
demand, increasing expenditure. The social value of higher
volume and expenditure may well depend on underlying
causes. Policy makers need to anticipate how competition
is likely to unfold, monitor early effects and be prepared to
act swiftly to address adverse developments.
Provider competition can improve health system
performance, but it’s not a panacea
Provider competition can contribute to stronger perfor-
mance, but it will not address all performance problems
and may have adverse effects. Neither economic theory nor
4 For a description of primary care and its evolution, see the Expert
Opinion on primary care [7].
5 The introduction of hospital competition in the UK did not seem to
worsen equity (in terms of waiting times), as had been feared, but
interpretation of the findings was difficult because increased compe-
tition coincided with a major central drive to reduce waiting lists [4].
Also for the UK, Cookson et al. [3] find a negative association
between market competition and elective admissions in deprived
areas. The effect of pro-competition reform was to reduce this
negative association slightly, suggesting that competition did not
undermine equity.
Competition among health care providers… 231
123
empirical evidence support the conclusion that competition
should be promoted for all health services. As a result,
policy makers need to think carefully about where, when
and how to introduce or increase competition. They also
need to be ready to respond to unintended consequences.
The devil is in the detail
The panel’s report concludes that competition can improve
access to health care; it may help to achieve lower unit
costs at the micro level, although aggregate costs will often
increase at the macro level; it may improve quality of care
if information about quality is reliable and pertinent and
prices are regulated; the extremely limited existing evi-
dence says little about its impact on equity. It is critical to
note, however, that it is not possible to make general pre-
sumptions about the effects of provider competition in
practice. Actual effects depend, to a very significant extent,
on the specific context: the devil is in the detail.
Implications for policy
When considering the use of competition among health
care providers, policymakers should take into account the
following:
1. Introducing or increasing competition in the provision
of health care is a challenging undertaking. The
conditions for success and risks for failure need to be
carefully assessed in every case. In the right context,
and with appropriate policy design, introducing com-
petition can help to meet some health system objec-
tives, although it is unlikely to contribute
simultaneously and positively to all.
2. The introduction of provider competition requires
additional policy actions—first, to ensure that the
market functions properly; and second, to ensure there
is careful, constant evaluation of outcomes. Ensuring
market transparency through the availability of infor-
mation on quality, price and other relevant dimensions,
to the extent that this is feasible and affordable, is
essential if competition is to improve health system
performance. However, the challenge of measuring
and comparing quality across services should not be
underestimated.
3. The introduction of provider competition also requires,
among other things, the enforcement of competition
rules to prevent the creation, strengthening and abuse
of dominant positions.
4. Policy concerns about equity underline the need for
careful monitoring of how the introduction of (or an
increase in) provider competition affects different
groups of people. While there is no general presump-
tion about the impact of competition on equity,
competition is not, in general, the best instrument for
addressing equity concerns. Effects on equity need to
be considered on a case by case basis—before to
predict, and after to monitor results.
5. Finally, given the paucity of empirical evidence, new
models based on competition should incorporate a
rigorous evaluation to ensure that the desired effects
are being obtained and to inform future policies.
Empirical analysis must, however, be interpreted in the
light of the specific context: it does not produce
universal rules. Health systems are complex adaptive
systems and small differences in detail can lead to
different impacts. This means there will always be a
degree of uncertainty about the results.
Competition can be either helpful or harmful, sometimes
even simultaneously depending on the objectives consid-
ered (e.g., efficiency versus equity). This implies that the
instrument of competition must be used wisely and cau-
tiously in health policy.
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